DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS/Bosnia Phased Troop Reduction

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 1999 . . . S. 2132. McCain motion to table the Hutchison amendment No. 3413.

ACTION: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO, 68-31

SYNOPSIS: As reported, S. 2132, the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 1999, will appropriate \$250.5 billion for the military functions of the Department of Defense for fiscal year (FY) 1999, which is \$2.810 billion more than provided in FY 1998.

The Hutchison amendment would require the President to continue the ongoing withdrawal of American forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Stabilization Force in Bosnia such that United States ground forces in that force or the planned multi-national successor force would not exceed 6,500 by February 2, 1999 or 5,000 by October 1, 1999. The limits would not apply: to the extent necessary for United States ground forces to protect themselves as the drawdown proceeded; to the extent necessary to protect United States diplomatic facilities in existence on the date of enactment of this Act; or to the extent necessary to support noncombat military personnel sufficient only to advise the commanders of NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The limits also would not apply to ground forces that might be deployed as part of NATO containment operations in regions surrounding Bosnia. Nothing in the amendment would be construed as restricting the authority of the President under the Constitution to protect the lives of United States citizens. Additionally, the amendment would prohibit the Defense Department from using appropriated funds: to conduct or support law enforcement and police activities in Bosnia, except for the training of law enforcement personnel or to prevent imminent loss of life; to conduct or support any activity in Bosnia that might have the effect of jeopardizing the primary mission of the NATO-led force in preventing armed conflict between Bosnia and the Republika Srpska; to transfer refugees within Bosnia, if such transfer would pose substantial risk to United States forces or would transfer control over territory from one Bosnia group to another; or to implement any decision changing the legal status of any territory within Bosnia that did not have the support of all parties to the Dayton Accords (a peace agreement for Bosnia). The President would be required to report to Congress by December 1, 1998, on the

(See other side)

YEAS (68)			NAYS (31)		NOT VOTING (1)	
Republicans	De	emocrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats
(26 or 48%)	(42 or 93%)		(28 or 52%)	(3 or 7%)	(1)	(0)
Abraham Bennett Brownback Burns Chafee Coats Cochran Collins D'Amato DeWine Domenici Hagel Hatch Jeffords Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McCain McConnell Roberts Roth Snowe Specter Thurmond Warner	Akaka Baucus Biden Bingaman Boxer Breaux Bryan Bumpers Cleland Conrad Daschle Dodd Durbin Feinstein Ford Glenn Graham Harkin Hollings Inouye Johnson	Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Mikulski Moseley-Braun Moynihan Murray Reed Reid Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Torricelli Wellstone Wyden	Allard Ashcroft Bond Campbell Coverdell Craig Enzi Faircloth Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hutchinson Hutchison Inhofe Kempthorne Murkowski Nickles Santorum Sessions Shelby Smith, Bob Smith, Gordon Stevens Thomas Thompson	Byrd Dorgan Feingold	1—Offic 2—Nece 3—Illne: 4—Othe SYMBO AY—Ar	r LS: nounced Yea nounced Nay red Yea

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progress being made toward the drawdown limits set in this amendment. The report would identify the specific steps the United States had taken to transfer the United States' portion of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia to European allied nations or organizations. The amendment would make numerous findings, including: the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia have accomplished the military mission assigned to them as part of the Implementation and Stabilization Force; the continuing mission in Bosnia is subject to congressional oversight; Congress may limit the use of appropriated funds to create the conditions for an orderly and honorable withdrawal of American troops from Bosnia; the Clinton Administration has set two deadlines for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces; United States military commanders have stated that there should be a firm deadline for withdrawing troops; President Clinton has changed his mind, and has said that there should not be any deadlines; NATO military forces have increased their participation in law enforcement, particularly police activities; and the United States Commanders of NATO have stated on several occasions that, in accordance with the Dayton Accords, the principal responsibility for such law enforcement and police activities lies with the Bosnians themselves.

Debate was limited by unanimous consent. After debate, Senator Stevens moved to table the Hutchison amendment. Generally, those favoring the motion to table opposed the amendment; those opposing the motion to table favored the amendment.

Those favoring the motion to table contended:

Argument 1:

We oppose this amendment with reluctance. When the Dayton Accords were first reached, and we were told that United States Forces would only be needed for 1 year to implement them, we thought that the time frame was ridiculously short. It will take years to return to any semblance of normalcy in Bosnia, and any multi-ethnic peace that is ever established there will likely prove to be ephemeral. The United States does not have vital national interests at stake in the region, and its involvement is costly and dangerous, and is causing a degradation in its military capabilities. We do not believe that this particular President was right to try to involve the United States in this conflict, and to spend nearly \$10 billion so far in the process, nor do we believe that he has given the slightest weight to Congress' concerns or its constitutional responsibilities. However, the response taken by the Hutchinson amendment is sim

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into two world wars that started in Europe, we doubt any Senator would make that claim. For better or worse, and we think better, we are in Bosnia, and we need to see the peace process through to its successful completion. We therefore urge our colleagues to table the Hutchison amendment.

Those opposing the motion to table contended:

Some Senators like to say that Congress has been responsibly exercising oversight on Bosnia. They point to sense-of-the-Senate amendments that have been passed, such as an amendment saying that we should withdraw in a "reasonable" period, and to amendments that tell the President to prepare benchmarks for the mission and to report to Congress. These amendments, though, have done nothing to stop the President from making unilateral decisions on the number of forces in Bosnia, the length of time they will be there, or what they are expected to accomplish. We suppose that if the war reignites and tens or hundreds of Americans are killed, these amendments will give a ready excuse to our colleagues. They will be able to point to the amendments, and say that they did their part to stop the President from continuing and expanding this ill-considered mission. They of course will not say that if they had supported amendments to force withdrawal by cutting funding, which even the most rabid supporters of presidential war powers concede that Congress has the right to do, then no Americans would have had to die.

So far the war in Bosnia has not reignited, but that does not mean that the United States has not been harmed. That involvement is seriously degrading our military capabilities. The cost, \$10 billion, is much more than we can spare, considering that our defense budget, as a share of Gross Domestic Product, is less than half what it was in 1986. President Clinton has fought, successfully, to slash military spending. As a result, procurement of modern military equipment has been virtually eliminated, force levels have been slashed, the real value of pay has fallen, and military housing has deteriorated. Morale is low, and the services are having a very hard time retaining trained personnel. For instance, the retention rate for F-16 pilots has dropped to just 28 percent. Pilots commonly turn down \$60,000 bonuses to reenlist. Further, the services cannot find enough qualified recruits to keep up with the normal rate of attrition even with their vastly reduced forces.

If we had not spent that \$10 billion on Bosnia, for a mission that still has not been clearly defined, we could have put the money into procurement, or pay, or housing, or training, or operations and maintenance, or other areas where there are clearly national interests at stake. We especially would have been pleased if that money had been used to build and deploy a limited missile defense system. The technology exists, and has existed for years, yet the Clinton Administration and liberal Democrats in Congress have blocked the United States from building a missile defense system.

The defense cuts would not be so damaging if President Clinton were not so constantly willing to send United States forces into harm's way. The Bosnia operation is only the most contentious and expensive military operation that the President has championed. Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 "operational events" between 1960 and 1991. Since that time it has conducted 26. The Marine Corps conducted 15 "contingency operations" between 1982 and 1989. It has conducted 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to Army Chief of Staff Reimer, the Army reduced manpower by 36 percent in the past few years and increased the number of deployed operations by 300 percent. These constant deployments are seriously degrading the value of our remaining military forces. To pay for them, operation, maintenance, and training accounts are constantly robbed, and they are destroying morale of military personnel who get very little time to spend with their families because they are constantly going on deployments.

Americans may be blithely unaware of what has been done to this Nation's defenses because disaster has not yet struck, but our forces are dangerously overcommitted everywhere and their capabilities are declining dramatically. For instance, if the United States were to deploy heavy tanks and armored cavalry to the Persian Gulf without taking any from Bosnia or North Korea, it would only have enough to match the number deployed by one of the three American corps that fought in the Persian Gulf War. For the United States to match the number of troops that it committed in that war, it would have to send virtually every current active duty member of the Armed Forces. No one would be left to fight in Korea, Bosnia, or anywhere else. Senators may think that our sharply reduced military forces in Europe would be available for a new Gulf War. However, those forces are already totally committed to the Bosnia operation. In Germany, 115 percent of resources are being used—the number exceeds 100 percent because funding is so inadequate that the military is being forced to take such actions as cannibalizing some planes in order to get needed parts to repair others that are being used in Bosnia.

When President Clinton unilaterally announced that the United States would lead a NATO mission to implement the peace agreement in Bosnia, he knew that opposition in Congress would be intense. He therefore promised that it would take no more than 1 year and that it would cost less than \$1.2 billion. After he had committed forces and they were arriving in Bosnia, Congress retroactively authorized that deployment. After he was reelected, President Clinton then unilaterally announced that he had decided United States combat forces would stay another 18 months in Bosnia. That deadline expired last month, but rather than withdrawing forces, President Clinton made the announcement that the forces would be there indefinitely. As the situation now stands, no authorization exists for the Bosnian deployment, no clear statement of what we intend to accomplish exists, and the mission could theoretically last forever.

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We have tried over the past couple of years to end this mission. If it had been up to us alone, funding would have been withdrawn immediately. Unfortunately, we know that for various reasons a majority of Members disagree with us. Therefore, with this amendment we are trying to at least put some limits on our involvement. The Hutchison amendment would require a drawdown in the forces in Bosnia. Without this amendment, as of this September we will have 6,900; under this amendment, that number would have to be reduced to 6,500 by February of next year and to 5,000 by October of next year. Those reductions would put our force levels on a par with the levels of our European allies, and would force the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for the mission. They should take that responsibility because they share common borders with Bosnia, and thus have much more at stake. In the past few years, most of our European allies have slashed their defense spending. They have not been carrying their weight, and they will continue to shirk doing their fair share if the United States foolishly lets them. As the Bosnian mission settles into a long, routine occupation, the risks involved will lessen and our NATO allies will be more than capable of running the mission. By cutting its forces in Bosnia, the United States would have more funds to prepare for defending its vital national interests.

The main argument against this amendment is that limiting troop levels would put our troops at risk. Our colleagues say that the number of troops is a military, operational decision. We disagree. Congress would not be setting troop levels as an operational decision, but as a policy decision that our military involvement would henceforth be limited. The purpose would be to make our European allies take a larger role. Further, the amendment explicitly provides that reductions would not be necessary to the extent that the military thought that they would interfere with the safety of our troops. We remind our colleagues as well that we are talking about capping our force levels—if they and the President are really so worried about troop safety, nothing is stopping them from ordering a complete withdrawal from this massive, unauthorized occupation of a foreign land. Frankly, many of us believe that this whole deployment is blatantly unconstitutional because it is not authorized, and that we are being very generous in our compromise offer to just have a more limited involvement. We urge our colleagues to accept this compromise.